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NOTES
THE COLLEGE SUPPORT DOCTRINE:
EXPANDED PROTECTION FOR THE
OFFSPRING OF BROKEN HOMES
When a divorce is granted, it is common for the trial court to include
an award of child support in the decree. The child's educational needs
are one of the factors which determine the amount of the award. To
decide whether a college education will be considered in determining the
extent of the child's educational needs, several recent decisions must be
considered. This note will briefly review previously existing college
support rules, discuss recent developments in those rules, and suggest
possible further improvements.
I. COLLEGE EXPENSE AS AN ELEMENT OF SUPPORT
Education at some level always has been considered an integral
element of the support required of divorced parents (usually the father)
for their offspring.' Grade school and then high school2 were both early
recognized as legitimate elements of support due to the increasing
educational requirements for competitive employment and the
frequency of attendance in the average family.3 Both of these
educational revels are now firmly entrenched as regular elements of the
support obligation for all divorced or separated fathers. The vast
majority of divorce courts presume that support during high school
shall be provided in all cases unless the father demonstrates a clear
inability to bear the expense.'
Since the leading decision of Esteb v. Esteb in 1926,5 it has become
I ;ec. e i, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E.
730 (1901), Division of Pub. Assistance v. Mills, 391 S.W.2d 363 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
2 e '. e i, Matthews v. Matthews, 245 Ark. 1, 430 S.W.2d 864 (1968); Barry v. Barry, 291
Mich 666, 289 N.W. 397 (1939); cf Sisson v. Schultz, 251 Mich. 553, 232 N.W. 253 (1930);
O'Brien v Springer, 202 Misc. 210, 107 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Middlebury College v.
Chandler, 16 Vt. 683 (1844).
3 C Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926).
4 See Matthews v. Matthews, 245 Ark. 1, 430 S.W.2d 864 (1968); cf. Golay v. Golay, 35
Wash 2d 122, 210 P.2d 1022 (1949).
5 138 ''ash. 174, 244 P 264 (1926); cf Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 58 N.J. Eq. 570, 43 A. 904
(1899); Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683 (1844).
Washington University Open Scholarship
426 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1969: 425
increasingly fashionable for appellate courts throughout the United
States to order divorced or separated parents, chiefly the father, to
finance their offspring's education beyond the completion of high
school.6 Some form of judicial or legislative inclusion of college
expenses as an element of the support obligation is now accepted in
every jurisdiction which has considered the question.7
Although the development of the college support doctrine in the
various jurisdictions has been by numerous methods, ranging from
inclusion of college in the common law definition of "necessaries" 9 to
interpretation of general support statutes, 10 the resulting "rule" in these
jurisdictions is fairly uniform." Express requirements, which must be
demonstrated to the trial court before an order may enter, include the
6. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 1207 (1957); & Annot. 133 A.L.R. 902 (1941), and cases collected
therein.
7. See Ogle v. Ogle, 275 Ala. 483, 156 So. 2d 345 (1963); Worthington v. Worthington, 207
Ark. 185, 179 S.W.2d 648 (1944); Straub v. Straub, 213 Cal. App. 2d 792, 29 Cal. Rptr. 183
(1963); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 210 A.2d 549 (D.C. App. 1965); Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 III. App,
2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1960); Dorman v. Dorman, 241 N.E.2d 50 (Ind. 1968); Beasley v. Beasley,
159 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1968); Allison v..Allison, 188 Kan. 593, 363 P.2d 795 (1961); Clark v.
Graves, 282 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); Luques v. Luques, 127 Me. 356, 143 A. 263 (1928);
Titus v. Titus, 311 Mich. 434, 18 N.W.2d 883 (1945); Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d
769 (1960); Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Refer v. Refer, 102
Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750 (1936); Lewis v. Lewis, 71 Nev. 301, 289 P.2d 414 (1955); Lund v. Lund,
96 N.H. 283, 74 A.2d 557 (1950); Nebel v. Nebel, 99 N.J. Super. 256, 239 A.2d 266 (Ch. 1968);
Winkler v. Winkler, 25 Misc. 2d 938, 207 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Crosby v. Crosby, 272
N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); Calogeras v. Calogeras, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 438, 10 Ohio Op. 2d
441, 163 N.E.2d 713 (1959); Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941);
Commonwealth ex rel. Decker v. Decker, 204 Pa. Super. 156, 203 A.2d 343 (1964); Atchley v.
Atehley, 29 Tenn. App. 124, 194 S.W.2d 252 (1946); Price v. Price, 197 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946); Barnes v. Craig, 202 Va. 229, 117 S.E.2d 63 (1960); Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174,
244 P. 264 (1926); Peck v. Peck, 272 Wis. 466, 76 N.W.2d 316 (1956).
8. The term "college support doctrine" as used herein, refers to the rules which govern that
portion of a divorced parent's child support liability which results in some measure from his
child's college education expenses. See generally Inker & McGrath, College Education of Minors,
6 J. FAM. L. 230 (1966).
9.. See, e.g., Straub v. Straub, 213 Cal. App. 2d 792, 29 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1963); Calogeras v.
Calogeras, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 438, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 441, 163 N.E.2d 713 (Juv. Ct. 1959); Fek v.
Feek, 187 Wash. 573, 60 P.2d 686 (1936). Contra, Hachat v. Hachat, 117 Ind. App. 294, 71
N.E.2d 927 (1947); Strayer v. Strayer, 26 N.J. Misc. 218, 59 A.2d 39 (Ch. 1948); Walits v.
Richter, 286 App. Div. 1068, 145 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1955).
10. See, e.g., Rawley v. Rawley, 94 Cal. App. 2d 562, 210 P.2d 891 (1949); Maitzen v.
Maitzen, 24 I11. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959); Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78
N.W.2d 216 (1956); Herbert v. Herbert, 198 Misc. 515, 98 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1950). These
cases interpret respectively: CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 139 (Deering 1960) (Repealed by Stats. 1969
ch. 1608, § 3); ILL. REV. STAT. eh. 40, § 19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); MicH. STAT.
ANN. §"25.103 (Supp.'1969); N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 240 (MeKinney 1964).
11. See, e.g., Dorman v. Dorman, 241 N.E.2d 50 (Ind. 1968).
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following: the child must be a minor, 2 unemancipated, 3 in the custody
of another," and of sufficient aptitude for college work.' Additionally,
and most importantly, the father must be financially able to pay.,,
Consideration in the past has rarely been limited to these five factors,
since the courts generally provide college support in only the most
exceptional cases. In these cases, a vast array of additional favorable
circumstances were available to sustain their decision. 17 A sampling of
these equitable circumstances 8 includes: the social status of the father;"
12 Se,% c, . Genda v. Superior Ct. 03 Ariz. 240, 439 P.2d 811 (1968); Rawley v. Rawley.
94 Cal. App 2d 562, 210 P.2d 891 (1949); Dorman v. Dorman, 241 N.E.2d 50 (Ind. 1968); Luques
v Luques, 127 Me. 356, 143 A. 263 (1928); Davis v. Davis, 8 Mich. App. 104, 153 N.W.2d 879
(1967); Pas. v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d 769 (1960); Cohen v. Cohen, 6 N.J. Super. 26,
69 A 2d 752 (1949); Robrock v. Robrock, 167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421 (1958); Price v.
Price, 197 S W 2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Peck v. Peck, 272 Wis. 466,76 N.W.2d 316 (1956).
(ontra. Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App.2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959); Hart v. Hart, 239 Iowa
142, 30 N 'A 2d 748 (1948). This requirement is one which should be altered in order to allow
greater utilty to the college support doctrine. See text accompanying notes 44-49, infra.
13 See, c g. Gerk v. Gerk, 259 Iowa 293, 144 N.W.2d 104 (1966); Clark v. Graves, 282
S W 2d 146 (Ky. Ct, App. 1955); Strayer v. Straver, 26 N.J. Misc. 218, 59 A.2d 39 (Ch. 1948);
c/ (odorniz v. Codorniz, 34 Cal. 2d 811, 215 P.2d 32 (1950); Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44
N A 295 (1890).
14 Se,,. ,g. Refer v. Refer, 102 Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750 (1936); Esteb. v, Esteb. 138 Wash.
174, 244 P 264 (1926).
15 Sc, e g, Ogle. v. Ogle, 275 Ala. 483, 156 So. 2d 345 (1963); Haag v. Haag, 240 Ind. 291,
163 N.F.2d 243 (1959); Gerk v. Gerk 259 Iowa 293, 144 N.W.2d 104 (1966); Anderson v.
Anderson, 437 S. W2d 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969)
In the past, the typical student in college support cases has been a straight-A student, armed
with a scholarship based on scholastic achievement. Apparently recognizing that trial courts do
not make very good admissions officers, several recent decisions have indicated that admission
to a college is sufficient proof of ability. See, e.g.. Dorman v. Dorman, 241 N.E.2d 50 (Ind. 1968);
,\nderon .\ndcrson, 437 SAV.2d 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Decker
lDecker, 204 Pa. Super. 156, 203 A.2d 343 (1964).
16 Sec. c.g. Nebel v. Nebel, 99 N.J. Super. 256, 239 A.2d 266 (Ch. 1968); Herbert v. Herbert,
198 Misc. 515, 98 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950); Golay v. Golay, 35 Wash. 2d 122, 210
P 2d 1022 (1949).
17 It is not uncommon to find early decisions stressing the need for some "exceptional"
circumstances:
Unlike the furnishing of a common school education to an infant, the furnishing of a
classical or professional education by a parent to a child is not a "necessary," .... It
may be that unusual circunmstances might make the furnishing of a professional or classical
education. . . enforceable in law against a parent. (emphasis added)
Halsted v Halsted, 228 App. Div. 298, 299, 239 N.Y.S. 422,424 (1930).
18. Although no court has expressly disclaimed these equitable circumstances as a requirement,
primarily because they are relevant to a trial court's discretion, some recent decisions are
noticeably lacking in their mention. See, e.g., Ogle v. Ogle, 275 Ala. 483, 156 So. 2d 345 (1963);
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 210 A.2d 549 (D.C. App. 1965); Elble v. Elble, 100 Ill. App. 2d 221, 241
N E 2d 328 (1968); O'Berry v. 0' Berry, 36 111. App. 2d 163, 183 N.E.2d 539 (1962); Sandier v.
Sandler, 165 N.W.2d 799 (Iowa 1969); Beasley v. Beasley, 159 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1968);
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the educational background of the parents;20 the previous educational
opportunities afforded the children; 21 the age of the child, with the
emphasis on the few years remaining before the child passes beyond the
jurisdiction of the court;22 scholarships and other academic
achievements;23 the number of children in the family;2 the income of
the custodial mother;2 and the amount of the child's own savings.
20
This note focuses on the requirement that the father must be financially
able to pay.
II. THE EXPANDED COLLEGE SUPPORT DOCTRINE
Today's American society requires expansion of the college support
doctrine. Happily, a group of recent decisions indicates that the courts
are now convinced that college educations are, for a large segment of
the population, a prerequisite to a competitive intellectual and
economic position, regardless of their parents' marital status.
A. The Need for an Expanded Doctrine
Although there are no nationwide surveys available, a limited survey
made in preparation of this note indicated that less than 10% of the
divorce decrees and incorporated separation agreements in Chicago,
Illinois, for the early part of 1969, included any provisions designed to
secure support for or during attendance in college by children of a
Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Nebel v. Nebel, 99 N.J. Super.
256, 239 A.2d 266 (Ch. 1968); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 170 Ohio St. 507, 166 N.E.2d 396 (1960).
19. See, e.g., Winkler v. Winkler, 25 Misc. 2d 938, 107 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup, Ct. 1960); Esteb
v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926).
20. See, e.g., Ogle v. Ogle, 275 Ala. 483, 156 So. 2d 345 (1963); Hart v. Hart, 239 Iowa 142,
30 N.W.2d 748 (1948); Herbert v. Herbert, 198 Misc. 615, 98 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1950); Commonwealth ex reL. Decker v. Decker, 204 Pa. Super. 156, 203 A.2d 343 (1964).
21. See, e.g., Winkler v. Winkler, 25 Misc. 2d 938, 207 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
22. See Dorman v. Dorman, 241 N.E.2d 50 (Ind. 1968); Haag v. Haag, 240 Ind. 291, 163
N.E.2d 243 (1959); Clark v. Graves, 282 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); ef. Sportsman v.
Sportsman, 409 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
23. See. e.g., Straub v. Straub, 213 Cal. App. 2d 792, 29 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1963) (full tuition
to Stanford Univ.); Clark v. Graves, 282 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955) (half-expenses to Notre
Dame); Commonwealth ex rel. Decker v. Decker, 204 Pa. Super. 156, 203 A.2d 343 (1964) (half
tuition).
24. See Ogle v. Ogle, 275 Ala. 483, 156 So. 2d 345 (1963); Beasley v. Beaslcy, 159 N.W.2d
449 (Iowa 1968).
25. See. e.g., Gerk v. Gerk, 259 Iowa 293, 144 N.W.2d 104 (1966). But cf. Maitzen v. Maitzcn,
24 111. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959) (an only child, but father remarried with two children).
26. Cf. Gerk v. Gerk, 259 Iowa 293, 144 N.W.2d 104 (1966). This is especially true if the child
is contributing summer earnings. See Dorman v. Dorman, 241 N.E.2d 50 (Ind. 1968).
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dissolved marriage.Y The apparent explanation of low percentage is
that until recently, even the states which had adopted a college support
doctrine were unwilling to indicate any general approval of college
liability for all divorced or separated fathers. Rather, a courtroom
guarantee of financial support for advanced education has been
restricted to the offspring of broken families which had large incomes
or substantial personal assets . 8 This high income standard has been the
major impediment to expansion of the college support doctrine.
Statistical evidence illustrates that a college education should be
viewed in the same manner as grade school and high school in
determining the proper amount of child support.29 If the children of
divorced parents are not assured an equal opportunity for a college
education, they will be saddled with an initial disadvantage when
competing for more lucrative occupations. This is not to say that they
have some sort of right to a college education, but merely points out
that a college education should not be viewed as an extraordinary
advantage available to the rich. Rather, in today's American society,
a college education is becoming commonplace and should not be denied
to a child solely because his divorced parents are of average income.
The minimum standard of financial ability for a college support
27 Out of 500 divorce files for 1969 in the Circuit Court ot Cook County, Illinois, seiectea
at random, 41 included some express provision directed at college expenses. Incorporated
separation agreements in divorce decrees with clauses such as "The father agrees to pay for the
educational expenses of the children" were not considered. See Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich.
418, 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956) reversing an order for college support for two children, ages fourteen
and eight, on the basis that no evidence was yet available as to their college plans. Adherence to
this rationale may account for the low percentage of college support provisions included in
original divorce decrees. Of course, this means additional legal expenses and litigation for these
children when and if they do wish to attend college. See also Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal. 2d 609,
299 P2d 231 (1956).
28 "A rich man, well able to pay, might well be held for a college education of an extended
and expensive sort." Golay v. Golay, 35 Wash. 2d 122, 123, 210 P.2d 1023, 1024 (1949). This
restrained attitude represents a holdover from now outdated and rejected decisions which held that
the law is unable to place on a divorced parent any greater obligation toward his children than
the law has in the absence of divorce. See Morris v. Morris, 92 Ind. App. 65, 171 N.E. 386 (1939).
It is well known that there are worthy parents in all parts of the country, with sufficient
means to do, who do not send their children to college. We can not say that each of them
has failed in a legal duty to his child and to the state.
Id at 69, 171 N.E. at 387; cf. Miller v. Miller, 52 Cal. App. 2d 443, 126 P.2d 357 (1942).
29. The percentage enrollment in college increased 90.5% from 1960 to 1968 while high school
enrollment for the same period increased 38%. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRNCT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1969, No. 145, at 103 (90th ed. 1969). In 1967, the total
college and professional enrollment was nearly 50% of the total high school enrollment. Id., No.
141, at 101 The college graduate in 1967 could expect to have an annual mean income which
was more than $4,000 greater than a high school graduate. Id., No. 155, at 108.
Vol. 1969: 4251
Washington University Open Scholarship
430 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1969: 425
order is not translatable into a dollar amount. The discretion of the
trial court is, however, circumscribed by the income levels found
appropriate on the appellate levels. Although the amount approved on
appeal will vary, depending on whether continued support payments
plus college expenses have been requested, or only a continuation of
support payments in the same amount as paid during high school,"
rarely has a father with less than an exceptionally large income or
substantial personal assets been subjected to a court-ordered college
liability.3'
Unless college support is more regularly provided by trial courts at
the time of the divorce and affirmed by appellate courts, the result for
even those children who readily qualify for such support may well be
additional litigation, expense and delay.32 The psychological and
emotional strain of again dragging the family skeleton before the public
eye, linked with expensive legal services, may prove for many to be an
insurmountable obstacle.
B. Recent Developments
Some recent decisions indicate that exceptionally high incomes or
assets are not absolute prerequisites to a college support order.
Recognizing the increased college enrollment and widening gap of
income potentials between high school and college graduates, the courts
are apparently advancing to a position which will place advanced
educational training on the same level as high school.
The Indiana Supreme Court, bolstered by the passage of an
30. Compare Winkler v. Winkler, 25 Misc. 2d 938, 207 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1960), with
Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Iil. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959).
31. See. e.g., Olge v. Olge, 275 Ala. 483, 156 So. 2d 345 (1963) ($12,000 minimum income
per year); Straub v. Straub, 213 Cal. App. 2d 792, 29 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1963) ($173,200
inheritance); Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959) (rather earned
between $36,000 and $39,000 annually); Gerk v. Gerk, 259 Iowa 293, 144 N.W.2d 104 (1966)
($8,000 to $10,000 annual income; $170,000 in assets); Davis v. Davis, 153 N.W.2d 879 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1967) ($12,000 gross annual income); Titus v. Titus, 311 Mich. 434, lS N.W. 2d 883
(1945) ($10,000 plus in annual income); .Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704, (Mo. Ct. App.
1969) (had recently inherited lana valued at $210,000); Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d
769 (1960) ($15,000 annual income); Nebel v.Nebel, 99 N.J. Super. 256, 239 A.2d 266 (Ch. 1968)
($11,500 net income annually, $45,000 in property, $12,770 in stock); Herbert v. Herbert, 198
Misc. 515, 98 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950) (large income and lived in an expensive
environment); Commonwealth ex rel. Decker v. Decker, 204 Pa. Super. 156, 203 A.2d 343 (1964)
($30,000 in assets).
32. See Dorman v. Dorman, 241 N.E.2d 50 (Ind. 1968) (decision rendered one month after
fall semester commenced); Sportsman v. Sportsman, 409 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966)
("If he did matriculate he would normally be in his sophomore year at the present time").
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amendment to that state's general support statute,33 recently held in
Dorman v. Dorman34 that where children under support decrees were
accepted to college, even the low-income father must continue the
support ordered under the original divorce decree until graduation from
college, emancipation or attainment of majority, whichever occurs first.
By so holding, the court eliminated the financial ability of the father
as a condition precedent to support for college expenses. Instead, it
imposed a general liability on all fathers who have been paying support
unless they demonstrate that changed financial circumstances merit a
reduction of the support award.3 - The Indiana court cited the following
language from Peck v. Peck 3 1 a 1965 decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court:
[A] court should not relieve the father from at least being required to
continue paying the monthly support money provided in the divorce
judgment for the period prior to the child arriving at the age of 18
years. . . .Y (emphasis added)
This language clearly placed college and other advanced educational
programs undertaken during a child's minority on the same plane with
high school and stamped approval of college liability for all fathers
under a court-ordered support liability.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Crosby v. Crobsy3l
similarly decided in 1967 that the duty of a father with a $4,500 annual
income to continue support remains the same and should continue until
the child's majority, without regard to college attendance. The court's
rejection of the technical emancipation argument presented by the
33 lIND STAT. ANN, § 3-1219 (1968):
,[Tlhe court may require the father to provide all or some specified part of the cost
of cducaion of such child or children beyond the twvelfth year of education provided by
the public schools, taking into consideration the earnings of the father, the station of life
of the parents and child . . . involved, the aptitude of the child. . . as evidenced by school
records, the separate property of the child. . . and all other relevant factors ...
34. 241 N.E.2d 50 (Ind. 1968). In Dorman, a father who earned only $75 a week was required
to continue paying his two minor daughters $40 a week for their support and college expenses
because the father had not shown that this award had in the past been excessive or that his
financial circumstances were changed.
35. Of course, the mother could also petition for an increase in the support allowance. In some
jurisdictions, the child may be able to petition for an increase in his support allowance in his own
right, See Simonds v. Simonds, 154 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
36, 272 Wisc. 466. 76 N.W. 2d 316 (1956). The Peck court did not follow its own rule,
however, with a father earning $5,370 a year. The take-home pay of the father in Dorman was
only $3,900 a year.
37. 241 N.E.2d at 55; 272 Wis. at 467, 76 NW.2d at 319.
38. 272 N.C, 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967).
Vol, 1969: 4251
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father was based on that court's recognition that college now stands
equal with high school as an educational necessity.
Likewise, the Iowa Supreme Court in Beasley v. Beasley,3" faced with
a schoolteacher earning only $5,859 a year, required her, as mother,
to increase her support payments to $60 per month for nine months
for her oldest son's college expenses, and to repay $1,640 to the father
for voluntary contributions he made while the suit was in progress.
These cases mark a development which will result in more frequent
inclusion of support provisions for advanced education in divorce
decrees, especially for families of average or below average incomes. It
should not be assumed that courts are unaffected in this kind of case
by decisions from other jurisdictions. Throughout the development of
the college support doctrine-from denial of college expenses as a
"necessary," to its inclusion only for the rich-courts in the various
states have reinforced each other's views of the changing place of a
college education in American society." The Dorman case and others
like it merely signify that a college education has become a normal and
reasonable element of child support even for average and below-average
income families.
C. Remaining Improvements to the College Support Doctrine
By considering the father's ability to pay for both high school and
college on the same level, the courts are assuring that some support for
advanced education will probably be available. It does not, however,
guarantee that sufficient funds to adequately meet all college expenses
will be available.
The Indiana Supreme Court noted that continuation of the support
order in Dorman would furnish only approximately half of the
anticipated expenses of college education.4' With the father earning
only $45 more a week than awarded for support, an increased support
award in that case was clearly untenable. But courts should recognize
39. 159 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1968); accord, Sandier v. Sandier, 165 N.W.2d 799 (Iowa 1969)
($7,515 annual income). In addition to these cases, see Sportsman v. Sportsman, 409 S.W.2d 787
(Mo. Ct. App. 1966) ($7,800 annual income); cf. O'Berry v. O'Berry, 36 Ill. App. 2d 163, 183
N.E.2d 539 (1962). But cf. Golay v. Golay, 35 Wash. 2d 122, 210 P.2d 1022 (1949) (support
denied on $2,420 annual income).
40. See, e.g., Dorman v. Dorman, 241 N.E.2d 50 (Ind. 1968); Pass v, Pass, 238 Miss. 449,
118 So. 2d 769 (1960); Calogeras v. Calogeras, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 438, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 441, 163
N.E.2d 713 (Juv. Ct. Ohio 1959); Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941); Esteb
v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926).
41. Dorman v. Dorman, 241 N.E.2d 50,54 (Ind. 1968).
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at the time of divorce that the father is obligated to furnish as much
as is reasonably possible for the higher education of his children so that
trust funds may be more frequently employed for college costs." A
trust fund started at the time of a divorce, in anticipation of possible
college enrollment, requiring $5 a week (which would have represented
only 6.6> of the father's net pay in Dorman) would equal $2,400 plus
interest over a period of 10 years, an amount greater than total tuition
charges for a four-year program of study at many state-supported
schools.' Such a fund could additionally serve as ancillary protection
against unexpected medical expenses or death of the father and could
be designed to revert to the father if any of the contingencies did not
occur.
Minority age limitations on the jurisdiction of the court,4 another
limitation on the utility of the college support doctrine, have rarely
limited support for high school, customarily completed by age 18. The
same, however, is not true of college, where graduation frequently does
not occur until sometime after the twenty-first birthday."' This means
that, for the student whose birthday is between June and December and
who enters college at 18, the maximum support which can be compelled
by the court extends through only three years of study, one short of
graduation. If the state's legal majority is 18, no support would be
possible.
There are two possible solutions to this problem. The court might
simply extend its equitable jurisdiction over the parents and children
until graduation." Alternatively, a state could amend its general
support statute to continue the court's jurisdiction after the child's
majority for purposes of educational support. Illinois courts initially
42 Sec, t g., Allison v. Allison, 188 Kan. 539, 363 P.2d 795 (1961); Underwood v. Underwood,
162 Wash. 204, 298 P. 318 (1931).
43 See, c g. UNIVERSITY OF ALA. BULL. 1969-70, at 39; INDIANA STATE UNIV. UNDERGR.
BULl 1967-69, at 26; UNIVERSITY OF MO -COLUMBIA, GEN. CATALOG 1969-70, at 47-48.
44 With the exception of Illinois, states generally limit their courts' jurisdiction to provide
child support to the child's minority unless the child is physically or mentally disabled. See H.
CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 15.1, at 495 (1968).
Generally, the age arbitrarily selected for majority is twenty-one, although some states have
selected eighteen.
45 Sec, Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956) (the court states that the
child's senior year in college will not be supported).
46 Cl Matthews v. Matthews, 245 Ark. 1, 403 S.W.2d 864 (1968) (child reached majority
before graduation from high school, equity jurisdiction available for financial support until
graduation); Kruvant v. Kruvant, 100 N.J. Super, 107, 241 A.2d 259 (1968).
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adopted the first approach 7 but later rejected it." Thereafter, the
Illinois legislature acted to amend its general support statute as
suggested.49
Until such amendments are forthcoming, the solution of this
problem for the individual child lies in the separation agreement. Such
agreements, universally enforceable,-" need not be limited to the
minority of the children involved. Where such an agreement is possible
between the parents, counsel for the custodian or the children should
seek to include specific provisions extending college support to
graduation, rather than to any particular age or attainment of
majority.51 Such a provision will later prevent the father from
withdrawing to the more limited responsibility under the state's
statutes.52
In any event, the indirect effects of the expanded doctrine to counsel
for the custodial parent (or perhaps the children) may be an improved
bargaining position in negotiations for favorable separation
agreements, more varied financial programs, such as trust funds to
guarantee educational funds in the future, and more comprehensive and
complete support orders for the children of the dissolved family. For
the states, any expansion of parental responsibilities which results in
more opportunities for advanced learning without additional state
treasury expense stands as a skillful piece of social legislation. For the
parent who must pay, these decisions herald the possible development
of supplemental legislation which will permit support payments to
extend beyond the children's majority until graduation from college.
CONCLUSION
There are no empirical studies available to indicate what percentage
of divorced fathers are ordered to finance their offspring's higher
47. Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 1ll.2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959).
48. See Crane v. Crane, 45 Ill. App. 2d 316, 196 N.E.2d 27 (1964).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969): "[Alnd the court has jurisdiction
after such children have attained majority age to order payments for their support for
educational purposes only."
50. See, e.g., Weber v. Weber, 51 Misc. 2d 1042, 274 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Fam. Ct. 1966);
Commonwealth v. Grossman, 188 Pa. Super. 236, 146 A.2d 315 (Ch. 1958).
51. "College graduation" should be specified to avoid the pitfalls of a protected illness or
required military service, either of which might delay completion of school beyond majority.
52. Not infrequently, litigants in a divorce action, as an inducement to the settlement of marital
difficulties, are willing to assume obligations which in the cold economics of a subsequent marriage




education. Whatever the specilic figure might be, it would not be very
high. To a great degree, this percentage is low because until recently,
the father possessing only average or slightly below average income and
assets was almost never ordered to send his children to college. There
has been, however, a line of precedents requiring college financing by
parents whose earnings and assets were exceptionally high, with the
children benefitted in those cases having high intelligence. A further
restriction has been a legislative requirement that limited support to the
minority of a child, a relic of earlier theories of jurisdiction outdated
by the realities of a college education. This conservative history in the
appellate courts is primarily responsible for the present unequal
treatment of college and high school as elements of a divorced father's
support obligation. Recent decisions do represent a departure from the
past. These decisions merit consideration by the judges and lawyers
who are shaping both divorce decrees and separation agreements. If the
demands of our social climate are in any way relevant to the level of
education included in the obligation of the average man, this departure
surely will continue.
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